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REVIEWS.

The Development of English Thought. By SIMON N. PATTEN.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1899. Pp. xxvii + 415.

AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSOR PATTEN'S PSYCHOLOGY.

PSYCHOLOGISTS have of late years observed with appreciative interest the growing tendency among economists and sociologists to build certain portions of their respective sciences upon psychological foundations. Mr. Patten's latest work is a striking illustration of this tendency, and his psychological doctrines are sufficiently heretical to render them at once interesting and worthy of examination. It may contribute to a juster estimate of our discussion of these doctrines, if at the outset we comment briefly on the general intellectual temper of the book in which they are presented.

Few writers on social topics have dared to be so elliptical in their processes of inference as Mr. Patten, and a reader sensitive to the niceties of argumentation is teased now and again by the suspicion that all sides of the questions under discussion have not been fully and fairly dealt with. Remarkable generalizations are often made as though their truth were, like that of the multiplication table, obvious past all necessity for elaboration and defense.

Take, for example, the following diagnosis of English pessimism as a dermal disorder, the cherished opinions of regiments of philosophers to the contrary notwithstanding (p. 193): "An unbathed Englishman is a sensualist; a bath turns him into a gentle optimist. The bath-tub is the parent of that English optimism of which the last two centuries have seen so many examples." What more obvious? You wonder how it can have escaped you before, and immediately you behold in your mind's eye the dark and horrid hordes of pessimism retreating along with other noxious parasites, before the gentle erosive influences of the virtuous bath-tub. On second thought you suspect this is allegory. But if so, the author leaves you to discover the fact unaided.

This quotation will, perhaps, serve to suggest that Mr. Patten is fertile in generalization and subtle in deduction rather than strenuous in analysis. And let it not be supposed that this characteristic is

wholly wanting in merit. On the contrary, it results in immensely entertaining reading, in suggestiveness, in stimulation, in a dozen other desirable and admirable consequences ; but it cannot always conjure the forces of serious conviction, and it greatly enhances the difficulties of the reviewer, who desires to confront fairly the warrant for his author's assertions. We shall be obliged, therefore, in examining Mr. Patten's psychology to treat it upon its apparent merits, and without complete assurance of the foundations upon which it rests.¹

Sensory ideas, motor ideas, and an environment constitute the chief materials with which the author transacts his psychological business. The sensory ideas represent the information obtained by the struggling organism concerning its environment. The motor ideas represent the utilization by the organism of this information. Certain kinds of environment necessitate for self-preservation a relatively higher development of the sensory ideas, while other kinds demand more imperatively a motor specialization. Significant factors in such differences of environment are the conditions of food supply, the local or cosmopolitan nature of the social relations, the general economic circumstances represented by the civilization, etc. On this basis, and apparently springing from the shifting interplay of these processes, Mr. Patten distinguishes four distinct types or classes of individuals, for which he has selected the picturesque titles of clingers, sensualists, stalwarts, and mugwumps.² The clingers and the mugwumps do not lend themselves readily to biographical treatment, the former being apparently too similar to one another and the latter not similar enough for cogent and profitable description. So Mr. Patten abandons them and confines his attention to the less refractory careers of the stalwarts and sensualists.

Mr. Patten's fundamental conception concerning sensory and motor

¹ The genealogy of Mr. Patten's interesting psychological doctrines may be somewhat more accurately detected in his monograph upon the *Theory of Social Forces*, 1896. He has at least escaped the perverse fate which has so often overtaken economists and sociologists when discussing mental processes, for he shows himself wholly free from the fetishes of the faculty psychology. The present work devotes the opening chapter (fifty-six pages) to an explicit discussion of psychological principles, and the author states definitely in his preface that the remainder of the book is built upon these.

² There have been many hard sayings anent the mugwumps, but Mr. Patten's is quite the "most unkindest cut of all." He says (pp. x-xi): "Such men are vigorous in thought, but weak in action. They cannot act together, but make admirable critics. They are cosmopolitans in their sympathies, advocates of compromise in politics, and agnostics in religion, and may be called mugwumps."

ideas and their relations to the environment will seem to many readers so obvious and reasonable that we shall doubtless encounter but little sympathy in our criticism of this portion of his psychology. This will be especially true in the case of readers familiar (and who is not?) with the general doctrines advanced by Darwin and Spencer. Not that the position underlying our criticism is necessarily hostile to the principles represented by these writers, but simply that the correct application of these principles involves a psychological formulation somewhat different from the one proposed by Mr. Patten. Men certainly differ vastly from one another in the relative amounts of reflection and muscular action in which they indulge, and one of the important items in determining this relation is undoubtedly the environment, in the broad sense of that term. But reflection cannot be regarded as completely synonymous with the having of sensory ideas, as Mr. Patten seems at times to imply (p. 30), although we frankly confess that we find him difficult to follow on these points; nor can action be exclusively connected with one special class of ideas, such as those Mr. Patten denominates motor. For, in the first place, all sensory processes are implicated with motor consequences; and, in the second place, there are no such things as motor ideas which *as ideas* are not sensory. That *all* consciousness is motor is today a psychological commonplace. Movement as a psychological factor is always represented by sensations, originating sometimes in the part of the body moved and sometimes in sense organs relatively remote from the moving member. But in every case the movement is reported by a group of sensations, and a voluntary repetition of the movement is executed psychologically by a mental anticipation of some of the sensory effects of the movement. Mr. Patten appears, moreover, entirely to overlook the motor accompaniments of sensory activities, as is natural in view of his position. He says, for example (p. 7) that a cosmopolitan environment develops the sensory powers by necessitating nice discrimination, and straightway forgets that every act of sensory analysis involves a definite motor adjustment for its execution, and that modern psychology has shown this motor adjustment to be the very heart of the sensory activity, and consequently a process which must necessarily develop *pari passu* with the sensory action. The fact is that the difference between sensory and motor ideas is, as has recently been pointed out by several writers, one of function and not of content. Our criticism of Mr. Patten at this point may appear to involve a merely ornamental logical refinement upon the common-sense facts of the situations. But to this it

may be replied that, if an author indulges himself in psychology, he may fairly be asked to do it correctly, and that, if the distinctions for which we are contending are correct, a neglect of them will ultimately be followed by confusion. We shall find an illustration of the last point in certain of Mr. Patten's other doctrines.

After the considerations advanced in the previous paragraphs it is hardly necessary to say that we cannot assent unhesitatingly to Mr. Patten's assertion that races differ more in their motor reactions than in their sensory ideas. It would be practically impossible to prove this assertion, supposing it were true, and inferentially, on the basis of the grounds just canvassed, we are confident that it is not true. The only warrant for the statement is the fact that we see races acting in different ways. Whether their sensations are alike or not is a matter of sheer speculation. But, unless our notions of the psychological antecedents of movements are intrinsically erroneous, we can feel speculatively assured that races are as diverse in sensory experiences as in any others.

Mr. Patten's doctrine that character depends upon habitual motor response belongs in the same general category with the matters just mentioned, although the author may expect to meet a less extended range of sympathizers upon this point, while to not a few of his readers the proposition will seem to furnish an instructive illustration of putting the cart before the horse.

In order to get his machinery agoing Mr. Patten introduces us to our old psychological friends pleasure and pain, but under the aliases of "pain economies" and "pleasure economies." It appears that a pain economy is the name for a condition in which men are principally engaged in avoiding pain, while a pleasure economy is one in which the chief occupation is seeking pleasure. Primitive conditions are more richly represented under the pain economy, civilized societies tending to monopolize the pleasure economy. It must grieve the painstaking critics of hedonism, whose contentions are distinctly relevant as against the view here presented, to hear an enlightened man like Mr. Patten setting down these principles as blandly as though no one had ever questioned them. But, anyhow, this is the point at which Mr. Patten begins to make his environment efficacious in the development of classes, the only genuine classifications being, he assures us, based on psychic characteristics. Wealth and social position, which are typical of prevailing classifications, do not represent psychic conditions, and are therefore superficial.

In examining Mr. Patten's classes we shall find our prophecy of logical disaster confirmed by a practical desertion of the genuine sensory and motor distinction. We shall meet with classes whose characteristics are defined in terms of activities, comprising both sensory and motor elements, together with certain other factors previously unmentioned. I do not remember that Mr. Patten anywhere asserts that his classes are deduced from his sensory-motor premises. But it seems reasonably clear that, if his original position was correct, the differentiation into classes should afford the strongest confirmation of it, instead of involving its practical abandonment.

The first class described is that of the clingers, and we are immediately confronted with an account of certain emotional conditions—timidity, shyness, etc. These characteristics are called out in response to an environment with a limited food supply. The people are conservative and stay at home, instead of going out to search for fatter lands, as might seem the more natural procedure. It does not appear that they possess either peculiar proficiencies or defects in their sensory qualities, and their motor activities do not seem to be stunted save in the direction of travel, adventure, and fighting. It is rather their emotional life, which is confessedly both sensory and motor in its constitution, that marks them off from others.

Similarly class two, the sensualists, are described as persons with some dominant passion to be satisfied, and their time is spent exploiting man and nature in its gratification. To the onlooker it must be admitted that a man of this class might seem more definitely motor than the clinger. But it is the direction of his muscular energies which distinguishes him, rather than the sum total of such energy expended, and both of them seem to have emotional characteristics as their most specific marks.

The third type, the stalwarts, manage to combine "a love of dogmas and creeds" with "independence in thought and action." We are now frankly involved with a description in which sensory and motor elements are blended beyond the hope of profitable analysis.

The fourth and last class, the mugwumps, are apparently the only ones legitimately descended from our sensory and motor ideas. They are strong in sensory analysis and weak in action, especially organized action. But again, when one recalls the amount of trouble the mugwumps have caused first and last, it seems incredible that they should be described in terms of inactivity, and we are led to see once more

that the only tenable distinction applies to the nature and direction of their action, and not to the presence or absence of action as such.

In short, the description which Mr. Patten offers of his social classes not only enforces our strictly psychological contention regarding the indissoluble connection of sensory and motor processes, but it also suggests that Mr. Patten has worked with a somewhat narrow and arbitrary conception of action. He seems always to have in his mind, when emphasizing motor activities, the more violent, or, at least, the more distinctly manual, forms of occupation. That these involve the larger muscles and a larger expenditure of muscular energy, hardly admits of debate. But if the distinctions at issue are those of motor as against sensory processes (granting the validity of the distinction for the sake of the argument), it will not do to substitute unannounced a distinction resting on the size of the muscles employed, or the violence with which they are exercised, and it is something of this kind to which several of Mr. Patten's differentiations reduce themselves.

To sum up this part of our criticism we may say, then, that the notion of the separate development of certain ideas called sensory and certain ideas called motor is psychologically untenable: that the attempt to apply this notion in the classification of individuals on a psychic basis results, first, in the introduction of emotional characteristics supplementary to the sensory-motor distinction, and, second, in a practical abandonment of the distinction in favor of a classification based on activities in which both sensory and motor elements are equally represented.

The relation of the environment to the organism involves problems which are usually regarded as biological rather than psychological. But there is, of course, also a psychological problem involved here, and we must notice briefly Mr. Patten's mode of handling it. Moreover, it is here that he shows most clearly the school in which his thought has developed. Waiving the frequent passages in which he finds it necessary, as would any writer employing the point of view of common sense, to speak of the individual as producing changes in the environment, his fundamental doctrine, both from the psychological and the historical standpoint, is expressed in the proposition (*cf.* p. 14) that "every marked change in the environment gives rise to a new epoch in thought." He carries this further in the remarkable doctrine, whose validity falls outside the scope of this examination, that the constructive thought of each epoch follows the regular order: economics, æsthetics, morals, and religion, and that the ethical thought of any epoch—to illustrate in a single instance what Mr. Patten postulates of each of

these fields of reflection — springs entirely from its own economic antecedents and not from the ethical thought of preceding epochs.

So far as there is a psychology involved in this conception of the significance of the environment for the organism, it is the position of the extreme associationists, the conception of a relatively quiescent mind bandied about by the forces of its surroundings. Against this doctrine the apperceptionists have waged a vigorous and generally successful campaign, emphasizing its decrepitude on the side of both substantiating facts and coherent theory. I cannot discover that Mr. Patten examines systematically the warrant for assigning to the economic environment such tremendous intellectual consequences, while seeming to assume that it is itself in its origin relatively independent of consciousness. If Mr. Patten means his statements merely as an account of certain periods in history and chooses to begin with the appearance of apparently new economic epochs, there is little ground for questioning his procedure. But this does not seem to be his intention, and we are obliged to protest that his theory is one-sided. No one doubts that economic conditions have been factors of utmost moment in the development of reflective consciousness, but the psychological doctrine (leave alone the historical verification of the implications) here advocated (p. 43), in accordance with which these economic conditions are made to appear as the sole real causes of the trend of reflective thought, can only be established by making the term "economic" cover all the other fields from which its application has by implicit definition already been distinguished.

Mr. Patten is, however, better than his theory, and he actually traces for us, in his exceedingly graphic manner, a number of instances in which, so far as concerns the individual, the strict validity of his theory is refuted. Indeed, one of his more important doctrines lends itself only reluctantly to reconciliation with the conception we have just discussed. Character, which, it will be remembered, is connected with motor response, is, he says, enduring, whereas the environment is constantly undergoing change. This leaves us with the somewhat perplexing psychological problem on our hands of accounting for a relatively stable set of motor activities, manifesting considerable independence of changes in the environment, and a highly unstable set of reflective thought processes, varying with every important alteration in this environment. Leaving this problem out of consideration, however, the point we wish to emphasize is the absolute dependence of only part of the processes of consciousness upon the environment, *i. e.*,

those which are reflective, the motor elements possessing on Mr. Patten's showing relative permanence and independence. We are again face to face, therefore, with Mr. Patten's sensory-motor distinction. All that we have previously said upon the subject is necessarily relevant here, and it can hardly be doubted now that Mr. Patten really has separated the two realms as completely as we indicated. From the practical, common-sense point of view we venture to inquire whether the average intelligent reader is ready to admit that the results of ethical and religious thought are as transitory and fleeting as this conception requires, and whether motor activities are in any sense so obstinate against the ravages of time as this theory implies. If not, it may be that the seemingly technical contention which we discussed earlier in the paper in maintaining the fallacy of Mr. Patten's sensory-motor doctrines, had involved in it consequences of real practical moment for the psychological interpreter of history. Either thought and action are more intimately related than Mr. Patten's views admit, or else our psychological and common-sense notions are all wrong.

Mr. Patten advances several other interesting theories, which we cannot examine at this time. His treatment of the transmission of psychological characteristics from generation to generation is one of these. He has also a good deal to say of curves of thought and visualization, although these points strike me as chiefly interesting for the suggestive light they throw upon the author's own thought processes. These matters are mentioned simply to indicate that we have not touched upon the whole of Mr. Patten's psychology.

If our criticism has been almost wholly hostile, it must not be assumed that we regard Mr. Patten's accomplishment as worthless. Quite the contrary. Where we have been obliged to differ with him most sharply, his shortcomings, as we believe them to be, exhibit in the most conclusive manner the really vital uses to which psychology can be put in the service of such inquiries. Too often writers have confined themselves to the mere enunciating of a program. Mr. Patten has made an extremely interesting effort actually to realize such a program, and for this he deserves every credit. Furthermore, psychology has not yet emerged so completely from the limitations of individualism as to render impossible the cherishing of diverse and opposing views. We have attempted to state the merits of the case as between Mr. Patten's views and what we believe to be the facts. The reader must decide the issue for himself.

JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL.

AN EXAMINATION OF PROF. PATTEN'S HISTORY AND ECONOMICS.

Every epoch has given to the world its own philosophy of history, or attempt to interpret events of the past and present in the light of the *Zeitgeist*. This interpretation has always been determined by the peculiar circumstances and dominant thought of the period. Consequently, since Josephus the content of the term "philosophy of history" has changed many times. Nor is this strange, for civilization in its triumphant march impresses its character upon all the vital ideas of the race, widening the thoughts of men from age to age. Montesquieu gives the theme for all our modern philosophies of history, upon which there have been many variations in these latter days. For he affirms the authority of law in human events and seeks to connect historical periods through the relations of cause and effect. One of the latest contributions to the field is Barth's *Philosophie der Geschichte als Sociologie*, which seeks to identify the two subjects, philosophy of history and sociology. And now we have before us another achievement along the same line.

Dr. Patten's *Development of English Thought* is an interpretation of history from the economist's standpoint. This we learn from the title: "The Development of English Thought—A Study in the Economic Interpretation of History." And the author, moreover, informs us in the preface that it is his aim to present a theory of history through concrete illustrations. An economic interpretation of history is not new, for we discover it in the writings of St. Simon and Louis Blanc at the beginning of this century, and again in Émile de Laveleye's *Political Economy*, where the following statements appear:

The power of states is proportional to their population and their wealth. The development of population and wealth depends upon economic causes. These, therefore, are the ultimate source of the great events of history.¹

Dr. Patten's economic bias is decidedly shown in his treatment of the French Revolution, which he attributes solely to the rise in the price of wheat. According to him, the revolution was a veritable bread riot. The people were not crying for food, but for comfort, for wheat bread had become the standard of comfort in the eighteenth century. The oppressions of the poor, the outrages they were forced to endure at the hands of the nobles, all the woes of the peasants with which we have become familiar through the graphic pen of Taine, would never

¹*The Elements of Political Economy*, translated by ALFRED W. POLLARD, pp. 12 and 13.

of themselves have produced the French Revolution. These ills, moreover, have been woefully exaggerated, says Dr. Patten. No, this great social upheaval was caused alone by the economic change which forced wheat out of France into England.

The central idea of the book is that economic conditions determine the development of civilization and thought in any particular epoch, and the type of man that shall survive. Therefore, new philosophies develop out of new economic conditions and not out of old theories. In the end, the philosophies may blend, but this blending is an afterthought, and is not due to the second philosophy having sprung from the first. To the ideas of St. Simon and Louis Blanc, that the two factors which form history are economic desires and economic progress, he adds a third, that of national character. "The interplay of the character forces in men and the economic forces in their environment causes progress," he tells us on p. 13. We thus see that Dr. Patten gives almost as much weight to the influence of national character on the development of civilization as Le Bon when he says, "The character of a people is the keynote to its destiny. It creates its destiny;" or as Bagehot, when he declares: "By far and out of all question the most important of all circumstances affecting political problems is *national character*." Le Bon, in his *Lois psychologiques de l'évolution des peuples*, says that the mental constitution or character of a race represents, not only the synthesis of the living beings which compose it, but, above all, that of the ancestors who have contributed to form it. It is not the living but the dead that play the preponderating rôle in the existence of a people. They are the creators of its morals and the unconscious motives for its conduct. We find much the same thought in Dr. Patten's careful analysis of national character. For he tells us that the forces generated by the present environment are not the only forces that determine the action of the men who live in it. Past environments still exert force through the modifications they have made in national character. These two forces are always in conflict. The ideas holding over from the past give tone to the civilization. The remodeling influences come from conditions set by the immediate environment, and through them the economic forces get their power (p. 13).

Dr. Patten chooses the three epochs of English history since the time of the Reformation for illustration of his theory. England, on account of its isolation, presents the best field for the study of normal thought development, and in the three epochs just mentioned English

thought was less influenced by foreign ideas than at any time in its history. Yet we are astonished that a book dealing with the development of English thought should confine itself to periods after Bacon and Shakespeare, and should practically ignore the work of the literary man if expressed in any other than economic or philosophic form. With the exception of Wordsworth and his contemporaries, Dr. Patten ignores the English "littérateur" as a shaper of the thought of his age. The popular writer receives no credit for his influence in the formation of public opinion, in the molding of national character, or in the dissemination of the great truths of science. When we consider the tremendous influence of Tennyson since the middle of the century upon public thought, to say nothing of the effect of the social novel since Dickens' innovation of the same, in creating ideals, we can but conclude that Dr. Patten's treatment of his subject is not as broad as it might have been. We know how responsible the popular writer is for the public sentiment prevailing on any topic of the hour. We must all agree with Mr. Stead, for instance, that Kipling, through his works, is a shaper of the destiny of the race. In the *English Review of Reviews* for March, Mr. Stead comments thus on "The White Man's Burden":

It is an international document of the first importance. It is a direct appeal to the United States to take up the policy of expansion. The poet has idealized and transfigured imperialism. He has shown its essence to be, not lordship, but service. . . . It will be strange if these seven stanzas do not prove more than a match for all the millions and all the eloquence of anti-expansionists like Mr. Carnegie and Mr. Bryan.

And, again, it seems passing strange that no weight is given to the effect upon English national character of chivalry, that great institution of the Middle Age. Its contributions to thought and character were permanent, for we can trace the ideals of self-sacrifice and self-assertion—two important traits in English character—back to this very period. And these ideals were fixed in English literature for all time by Sir Thomas Malory in his great epic, *Morte Arthure*, at a time when the institution which had produced them was about to yield to other forms of organization for which society, owing to the revolutionizing economic progress of the fifteenth century, was then more fit.

After the psychological preliminaries discussed above by Dr. Angell there follow the statements that the history of thought passes through four stages—the economic, the æsthetic, the moral, and the religious; that the study of any epoch involves, first, the consideration

of the prevailing economic conditions, then that of the economic doctrines which flow from them, and next that of the æsthetic, moral, and religious ideas which the epoch produces. But most startling of all, and absolutely at variance with our accepted ideas on the subject of thought development, the author next asserts that the history of æsthetic, moral, or religious thought, each taken independently, is impossible because later epochs do not grow out of older ones, but out of new material. History must be studied in epochs, and each group of ideas should be connected with its roots in the underlying conditions, and not with its antecedents in the same group. The blending of the old with the new of the same group (which fact Dr. Patten must acknowledge) happens after new conditions have exerted their force or have brought out what is most peculiar to them. Here we strike the keynote of the author's theory—new economic conditions form the basis of thought development. The race has passed through a series of temporary environments, each of which has contributed certain characteristics that have become a part of national character. Character is the one enduring, growing element in a civilization where all else is temporary and fleeting. Economic conditions produce the primary motor reactions. Under new environments, where new conditions for survival obtain, these motor reactions respond to abstract instead of concrete phenomena. The concepts created by the motor reactions disappear if they do not harmonize with new conditions. If they do, they become ideals. Motor reactions, once formed, do not readily fall into disuse; they are appropriated by ideals.

Dr. Patten next informs us that there are two classes in society capable of progressive thought—the philosophers and the economists; that the influence of the observers (economists) on the thinkers (philosophers), and of the thinkers on the observers, causes progression in thought. Every transition to a new environment tends to develop a new type of man and remodel the old. From the new arise the economists, from the old the philosophers. The former proceed on an upward curve of thought from facts to theory, the latter on a down curve from theory to facts. English thought divides itself into three epochs. In the first progress is due to Hobbes, Locke, and Newton; in the second Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith are the master spirits; and in the last it is the work of Malthus, Mill, and Darwin that influences thought development.

Chapter 2 is devoted to the antecedents of English thought. Following Montesquieu and Buckle, Dr. Patten makes the determining

factors in the production of the three types of early civilizations the action of the immediate physical environment on man and man's reaction against nature. Thus, in the cold, wet country, where natural forces act regularly, where man subdues nature, we discover well-knit social groups with a civilization distinctively moral. The German is a type of this development. In the hot, dry country, where natural forces are overpowering, where man yields to nature, hope and humility are developed, and we discover a civilization essentially religious in character. Of this type Semitic civilization is a good instance. The third class is formed by the tribute-takers—the conquerors who live by controlling other people. In this society the concept of citizenship is formed and law is developed. Roman civilization is the type. These three types have together furnished the basis of English thought and character.

The fifteenth century was a period of change and progress for England as well as for the rest of Europe. The invention of printing, the use of gunpowder and the compass, the discovery of America, the introduction of chimneys and glass windows into houses, and beer, sugar, and sweets into diet, revolutionized every phase of society. Family life was now made possible and agreeable. In part, at least, communal life was supplanted, and woman's position became higher. The church of the Middle Age inculcated habits of thought that lay at the basis of social progress.

In the sixteenth century the development of England began to be differentiated from that of the continent. From now on it was more normal.

The next period treated is that dominated by the thoughts of the Calvinists; indeed, the chapter is entitled "The Calvinists." Calvin's scheme was the outgrowth of the economic ideas of the age. Its central thought was the covenant between man and God. The whole scheme was legal rather than moral. Resulting from the sudden change in economic conditions, which clothed the Englishman in wool and placed him before a fire, we have three types of character—the sensualist, the original, unmodified Englishman, who retained the dross of primitive times; the clinger, who wished to keep things as they were, who wanted peace and security, and believed in the divine right of kings; and the stalwart, or concrete Puritan, who soon died of consumption because he did not care for comfort.

The first great thinker of the age was Hobbes. His main thoughts are, that necessity is the only rule of action; that nature is in a state

of warfare, to overcome which societies are formed; that the power of the king is supreme. He fails to solve the problem of the age.

Locke next follows with an important contribution. This is the principle of indifference. "There are things in their own nature indifferent," he declares. He thus adds a new group to the old categories of the good and the bad—the indifferent. He attacks superstition on the one hand, and enthusiasm on the other, declaring that all ideas come through sense impressions. There is no expression without impression. Any excess of expression is either superstition or enthusiasm, and therefore bad.

Dr. Patten next speaks of the relation of Locke to deism, and in the following passage seems to contradict part of his theory: "If we follow the development of abstract thought subsequent to Locke, the contributions of the deists cannot be overlooked. But it is more important to look on the practical side of Locke's work and see how the deists are connected with it. Viewed in this way they make a stage in religious development that begins with Locke and ends with Wesley."¹ Does not this conflict with his statement in chap. 1 that it is impossible to follow the history of thought in any one field independently—that the development of any line of thought does not depend on the antecedent thought in the same field, but on new economic conditions of the later epoch? The deists attack the prevailing notion of God, denying that he delegated his power to anyone, or that he interfered in the affairs of men. Consequently they were antagonists of the current doctrine of the divine right of kings. At this time Newton began his work which resulted in a reconstruction of the theory of the universe. The law of gravitation transformed the old concept of chaos to the new one of cosmos. Dr. Patten tells us that since Locke there has been no development of political thought in England. Progress in the eighteenth century was absolutely independent of political life. Does careful investigation of English political institutions warrant his summary disposal of this most important topic?

To Locke, the deists, and Newton are due the new idea of God as a God of love, the transformation of morality (everything of which the reason can judge is placed in the new category of the indifferent), and the separation of government and law from morals and religion. Two new types of character now arise—the stalwart, who places race ideals above reason, and the mugwump, who places reason first.

The next chapter, on "The Moralists," traces the evolution of

¹P. 175.

thought in the eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century thought, Dr. Patten says, was not a continuation of seventeenth-century ideas, but a new movement. In the seventeenth century the city invaded the country and destroyed sensual customs, the survival of communal days, while in the eighteenth the towns were the places that needed reform. One section moved forward in the seventeenth century, another in the eighteenth. The improvement in agriculture and the elevation of family life are the two marked features of social progress in the last century. Mandeville is cited as the first thinker. In his "Fable of the Bees" he states his thesis—that spending makes trade lively, frugality causes industrial stagnation. Therefore the necessities, vices, imperfections of men are the sources of all the arts, trades, and industries. He emphasizes the contrast between the workers and the leisure class, and makes the usefulness of the latter depend upon the need of luxury and vice to maintain trade. This theory was not wholly controverted until Mill proved the usefulness of frugality and the indispensability of capital. Hume, the successor of Mandeville, aims "to give a check to all kinds of superstitious delusions." He asserts that physical conditions have no effect on the human mind, that men owe nothing to air, food, or climate. "If we run over the globe or revolve the annals of history, we shall discover everywhere *signs of a sympathy or contagion of manners*, none of the influence of air or climate," he tells us in his *Essay on National Characters*. Do we not here find a suggestion of Tarde's theory of imitation? The third great thinker of the epoch makes human nature the controlling element of his doctrine. In his *Wealth of Nations* Adam Smith collects all the economic principles which had previously appeared and applies certain laws of human nature to the discussion of economic problems. He emphasizes the advantages of parsimony and condemns the evils of prodigality. It was due to his efforts that political economy became a recognized science.

The advancement in economic and philosophic thought paved the way to the religious awakening of Methodism. Puritans and plagues had disappeared. Religion needed a reinforcement of its claim. Wesley and Whitefield arose as the leaders of the new movement. The Calvinists visualized long-past events, especially the covenant and the assembled host of Israel at the foot of Mount Sinai. Whitefield visualized the future, laying stress on the picture of the last judgment. The failure of Calvinism was due to the ruling principle of predestination, which is incompatible with social progress, and which implies resignation,

the mental attitude characteristic of women. When society is confronted with evils beyond its control, this spirit is reflected in religion. Unavoidable evils foster, even in men, the spirit of resignation; unnecessary evils stir up, even in women, revolt. The environment and economic conditions thus determine what attitude will be dominant in a given society and what type of religion will do most for its elevation.

Just here, Dr. Patten tells us, a new type of man, "the womanly man," was beginning to be a factor in English society. He accounts for the existence of this new type in the following way: With the great industrial change brought about by the discovery of America there came a revolution in social life for which woman was responsible. Now really arises the English home. Men were satisfied with the established order of things. The great change from communal to home life and pleasures was accomplished by woman. It was she who cooked, scrubbed, worked in the fields, spun clothes, taught the children, and took care of the men. She was responsible for the cleanliness of the household, which in the days of the plague was the necessary condition of survival. So the industrial type of woman became dominant. Along with her duties came her power. She became the ruling factor in the home, and the womanly type of man—the man who accepted woman's ideals and standards of purity and resignation—became a fact in English history. A womanly type of man, in the industrial sense, *did* now become dominant, owing to the necessary change in activities brought about by economic development. Men were forced into new employments against their natural bent. Their new life kept them more at home. Consequently they felt the influence of woman in the creation of standards for conduct more strongly than ever before. Thus arose the "womanly man" of Patten. The author's interpretation of the great social changes of the fifteenth century as due to woman's initiative is hardly in accord with our accepted theory of woman's conservatism.

The eighteenth century demanded "manly men," or those vigorous in will-power. As Methodism brought forward this type, it tended to check the growing power of women. It brought to the front men who were too strong to be influenced by women. Hence the more primitive type of women who performed the duties of motherhood better tended to survive. Methodism and economics created a non-moral state of mind, which has remained a characteristic of English civilization. The new ideals made the people less moral, but not less conscientious. The effect of Wesley and Smith on English thought was to inculcate a distrust of general principles, a distaste for foreign innovations, and a

dislike of customs and traditions. People became individual, concrete, and local in their habits of thought. This attitude of mind fitted them for the next epoch.

The fifth chapter opens with a discussion of the causes of the decline of France. Our author boldly asserts that the wickedness and vice of the people were in no wise responsible for the decline of the country. He attributes the decay to economic causes—the rise in the price of wheat especially—which produced a constantly increasing deficiency in her economic resources. To the French Revolution he gives a picturesque value only, for he says: “The revolution in commerce, industry, social philosophy, and national ideals would have gone on just the same if France had submitted quietly to the inevitable loss of power and the rule of the Bourbons. She did not alter the course of history by her bold struggle for supremacy, but simply made history more interesting.”¹

This chapter, which is entitled “The Economists,” shows how thought in the nineteenth century is dominated by economists and philosophers who believe in social progress through influence as opposed to progress by selection. Thus we find the economic utilitarian and the philosophic utopian making human happiness the end of action. From this point of view Carlyle, Newman, Spencer, and Gladstone may all be classed together. Bentham first appears on the scene with the principle that security, not comfort, is the goal of human society. He gives us a negative idea of pleasure, emphasizing the removal of pain more than the acquisition of pleasure. Society was to be improved by burdening the evil-doer until he ceased to do wrong. Malthus follows with his theory of population, which caused an immediate conflict between the economists and the moralists, as it taught that progress meant poverty. To Ricardo is due the new concept of society which now arises. Smith and Malthus viewed society as an agricultural community. Now emphasis is laid upon the city and all the economic problems and complications which it entails.

John Stuart Mill contributes a new ideal of social progress and a new method of thought. His method was first that of pure induction based on experience. The generalizations thus obtained are then used as premises for deduction, and conclusions reached through this deduction are verified by fresh induction. The study of Wordsworth and the ideas of Sterling and St. Simon had great influence on Mill's own development. Comte also was one of the important factors in shaping

¹P. 278.

Mill's views. It was the study of Comte that led him to place great emphasis on the new sciences of ethology and sociology, which fact Professor Patten regrets in the following words: "The fact is that Mill's diversion from the natural trend of his development by Comte so weakened the credit of social studies that they have not yet recovered, nor can they recover their standing until the crude analogies derived from physical science are discarded. The bias of physical study hinders everyone who goes from physical to social science. The method of social science must be determined from its own problems."¹ Mill tried to establish a general law of causation by simple enumeration for the social sciences. Patten declares that no law of causation is needed to establish the position of social science, and then proceeds to give us his own social theory, with which we are all familiar—that the laws of pleasure and pain are the laws of social science, that the field of pleasure and pain is the field of social science.

With Darwin we have the completion of one epoch and the beginning of a new one. Darwin's argument may be divided into two parts—the economic, which may be summed up as the economy of food and its effect on the organism, and the biologic, which may be stated as the mutability of species and the idea of common ancestors. His four propositions are (1) the limitations of food supply, (2) the rapid increase of each species, (3) variability of descendants, and (4) evolution through pressure of numbers.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century we notice a change in the ideals of activity, of pleasure, and of God. The poets and the Oxford movement had much to do with this transformation. Through the poet nature became an animated personality—God was seen in everything. The Oxford movement created the ideal of a united church and gave an impetus to the service of praise that has influenced all denominations.

In the last chapter Dr. Patten sums up the conclusions of his study and offers a few predictions. He tells us that the cause of development during the three epochs in English history just reviewed was the opposition between communal and home interests and pleasures, and that the great result has been the reconciliation of religion and economics. The stock ideals of the race *were* religious, they have *now* become economic. Religious concepts have become utilitarian. The capitalistic tendency which leads men to put confidence in remote results develops faith in the unseen. In English civilization, the local

¹ P. 332.

and peculiar has been subordinated to the general and national. The unity of the older race was sensory. Men were held together by common environment. The unity of the English race is not environmental, but psychic. The race is held together by race ideals and social standards. The success of these means the success of the race. Our progress and ascendancy depend upon decisions which have already been made. The types of man that will ultimately prevail, Dr. Patten tells us, are the stalwart and the mugwump. The sensualists and the clingers are fast disappearing. There has been very little growth in national literature and art, we are told, owing to the fact that these fields have been dominated by the steriles or racial suicides, who can have no permanent influence on the race. So long as æsthetic feelings are a useless variation, unconnected with vital activities, progress will be impossible. Can we agree with Dr. Patten that a literature which has produced a Shakespeare, a Milton, a Wordsworth, a Tennyson, a Browning, and a Kipling is undeveloped? Though the author tells us that a psychic change is taking place in the men of the race rather than a physical one in the women—making the men more and more subservient, willing to give, and the women less and less economic, eager to receive—we cannot accept this conclusion in the face of the facts of today which seem to prove the direct contrary. For when has woman been more economic, more capable of standing alone in the struggle for advancement than she now is?

To gain that higher civilization for which the laws of economics discover the necessary qualities demanded by the conditions of environment, men must become active, hopeful, and altruistic, full of confidence in the future and in the unseen. The effect of present economic conditions on character is to cause the sacrifice of the higher for the lower which is incarnation, just as the sacrifice of the lower for the higher is evolution.

Dr. Patten concludes with the statement that the adjustment of the race is about half finished. Literature and art have failed to become national except in the first part of this century. Philosophy and education still adhere to foreign models, and there has been little development in law and politics.

We have already called attention to the fact that the vital parts of Dr. Patten's theory—that new philosophies develop out of new economic conditions and not out of old theories—is opposed to the best historical and sociological views of our age. Take but a single instance. I quote from Topinard in the *Monist* for October, 1898.

"Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke are the inaugurators of the English school [of philosophy]. . . . It led to Adam Smith, who discovers the sanction of morality in altruism or public approbation ; to Bentham, who sees it in interest rationally understood ; to Hume and the Scottish school, and finally to the existing school of J. S. Mill, Darwin, and Herbert Spencer."¹ This is but a typical instance of the historical interpretation of thought in every field today.

Moreover, we cannot agree with many of Dr. Patten's conclusions—statements which are utterly at variance with our accepted beliefs. Perhaps the most startling of these is his decision regarding English political development. The claim of the English that they have a peculiar aptitude for the development of political institutions is, he tells us, without basis. Since Locke there has been no development of political thought. The English have been too conservative to develop institutional life beyond the needs of primitive society. For the past two centuries there has been no dominant class, and so the race has prospered under conditions that would otherwise have demanded a development of its institutions. The peace and security which have prevailed far more in England than in any other European country, he declares, are due, not to Anglo-American institutions, but to instincts inculcated during the supremacy of the church, favorable economic conditions, and the spirit of compromise from opposing types. Given these conditions, and any institution would be successful. Quite a different valuation does Andrew D. White give to the influence of political institutions on the progress of civilization. In his preface to Müller's *Political History of Modern Times* he recommends the work "to all who desire a clear idea of that political development in modern Europe which has brought on the amazing events of these latter years."

Nor can we accept Dr. Patten's unique explanation of the transformations of social life in England from communal to domestic as due mainly to woman's initiative. Nor yet his statement that women are becoming more and more domestic and less and less economic. And, again, we are sure that loud cries of dissent will greet his assertion that there has been little or no literary development in England. Who will not resent as a reflection upon our culture the following : "Fathers and mothers have not yet become artistic and are too active to indulge much in novel-reading. The taste of the average mother seldom rises

¹ P. TOPINARD, "Man as a Member of Society," translated by T. J. MCCORMACK, the *Monist*, October, 1898, p. 68.

above the level of bric-à-brac and chromos, while the father is quite content with his newspaper."¹

Also, Dr. Patten's failure to recognize the splendid work that is being done in the field of sociology today, and his lack of appreciation of the achievements of his brother-scientists along lines so near to those of his own interest, are much to be regretted. Speaking of the emphasis Mill placed on the new sciences of ethology and sociology, he takes occasion to say: "The new sciences were yet to be made, and, unfortunately for Mill's reputation as a prophet, are still to be made." Mill let ethology drop, and no one has since taken it up. "Nor has sociology fared much better," he continues. "Until recently it was made up of a few analogies derived from biology, and even now it is not far enough advanced to obtain general recognition nor to have its method well defined."²

Thus, while we cannot agree with all that Dr. Patten says, while we must feel that there are important omissions in his book, while we must admit the biased attitude of the author, yet we are glad to welcome *The Development of English Thought* as an original, strong, and suggestive contribution to the economic and philosophic literature of the day.

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Problems of Modern Industry. By SIDNEY AND BEATRICE WEBB.
London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898. Pp. 286. \$2.50.

THESE gifted writers have collected a number of papers into an interesting volume of studies of English industrial conditions. "The Diary of an Investigator" shows a shrewd observer in contact with the life of the London sewing women. "The Jews of East London" introduces us to a world little known, perhaps, to wealthy members of the same race. Two chapters are given to questions of women workers, their wages, and the factory acts which aim to protect them. The latter part of the book is an interpretation of the socialistic program from the Fabian point of view. The relationship between coöperation and trade-unionism is the subject of an important chapter. The poor law is studied in connection with the general movement for enlarging the functions of the state.

¹ P. 385.

² P. 332.